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THE ENGAGEMENT OF LIVED-IMMEDIACY 
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNCOVERING 
OF THE FIELD OF HUMAN FREEDOM 
James Alan Tuedio 
"Hearts remote yet not asunder 
Distance and no space was seen 
So between them love did shine 
Either was the other's mine." 
— Goethe 
The engagement in lived-immediacy is a "timeless" 
moment that endures. Lacking all conceptual dimension-
ality, this experience not only "envelops" the partici-
pant, but also leaves him thoroughly suspended beyond 
the limitations of personality. In short, there is 
neither time nor an ego. Perhaps you are on a train 
that is slowly pulling out of the station. You see a 
face that reaches out, and suddenly you are experiencing 
the weird combination of fixity and change, the 
terrible moment of immobility stamped with eternity 
in which, passing life at great speed, both the 
observer and the observed seem frozen in time.* 
Thomas Wolfe continues his description of the experi-
encing of an engagement in lived-immediacy by reflecting 
back upon that 
one moment of timeless suspension when the land did 
not move, the train did not move, the slattern in 
the doorway did not move, he did not move. It was 
as if God had lifted his baton sharply above the 
endless orchestration of the seas, and the eternal 
movement had stopped, suspended in the timeless 
architecture of the absolute. 
Until Phenomenology established itself as a style of 
thinking for approaching the description of human expe-
riencing, it was presumed, for the most part, that ex-
periences of this kind constituted true immediacy. 
Emerson, writing in the essay "On Nature," remarks that 
his engagements in lived-immediacy leave him thoroughly 
surpassed: 
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Standing on the bare ground—my head bathed by 
the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite space 
--all mean egotism vanishes. I become a trans-
parent eyeball; I am nothing [though] I see all.2 
And Sartre, remarking in Being and Nothingness, has 
.found a similar position being expounded by Rousseau. 
Describing his pantheistic intuitions as "concrete 
psychic events in his history," Rousseau claims, accord 
ing to Sartre, 
that on those occasions he melted into the uni-
verse, that the world alone was suddenly found 
present as an absolute presence and uncondi-
tioned reality. 3 
Critiquing this view of "immediate experience," Sartre 
suggests that we can hardly ignore 
this total, isolated presence of the world, its 
pure "being-there": certainly we admit freely 
that at this privileged moment there was nothing 
else but the world. But this does not mean, as 
Rousseau claims, that there was a fusion of con-
sciousness with the world. (Sartre, p. 17 7) 
Rather, the conceptual distinction between self and 
other has been spontaneously bracketed from consid-
eration, and thus no perspective is being taken by the 
self upon that which engages its fascination. There is 
consequently, no "detachment" from the object which 
fascinates, but rather a living side by side where "ev-
erything is given at once in a sort of absolute proxi-
mity" (Sartre, p. 155). This "lightening intuition 
without relief" is regarded by Sartre as a calling out 
to Oneself "from the ground of the future" which reveal 
the spatiality of the world as being "one with the non-
positional apprehension by [embodied consciousness] of 
itself as unextended" (Sartre, p. 179). I am taking no 
perspective upon this other which engages my fasci-
nation, and thus am unable to determine what I am in 
terms of what I am not: I can, in short, take no per-
spective upon myself. There is only "process," only 
that mode of non-positional awareness, that "pure mode 
of losing myself in the world," which causes me to be-
come "drunk in" by prepredicative experience (Sartre, 
p. 259). Engaged by lived-immediacy, consciousness 
exists its body as the upsurge of perspective which is 
its fundamental orientation in situation, even as it is 
simultaneously surpassing its body in calling to itself 
from the ground of the future. We must suggest, there-
fore, that the individual who experiences lived-immedi-
acy is caught up in the immediacy. And whether that 
which "catches him up is an exquisite art object, a 
chestnut-root, or a statuesque blond sporting rosy 
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cheeks, his access to this lived-immediacy is a non-re-
flective mental'turning—towards which lets that which 
is available for concernful regard "be" in its presen-
tation of itself- For instance, a painter engages 
lived-immediacy when he allows his creation to reveal 
its own possibilities. And he can only allow this to 
happen insofar äs he lets these possibilities "show 
forth" in their own right even as he simultaneously 
appropriates them as his own possibilities. 
Sartre's discussion of authentic sexual relations 
Being and Nothingness strives to make a similar point 
(Sartre, pp. 387-398). Sexual desire, he writes, "is 
consciousness making itself body." For this reason, 
desire is not only the desire of the Other's body; 
it is within the unity of a single act — the 
non-thetically lived project of being swallowed up 
in the body. (Sartre, p. 389) 
This desire which is consciousness making itself body 
thus aims to reduce both myself and my lover to a state 
of "pure being-there." And this means, on Sartre's 
account, bringing-to-life the body as flesh. In other 
words, I no longer stroke my lover, as one might stroke 
a porcelain vase; rather, I effect a caressful shaping 
which renders us both touched passivities. We come to 
live side by side, if only for a moment's timeless ex-
panse, as that "shiver of pleasure" which Sartre terms 
the "awakening" of consciousness as flesh. And in so 
doing, we are engaged in relational lived-reciprocity, 
having transcended not only the limitations of person-
ality, but the objective manifestations of time as well. 
Each participant in the relation has lost all compre-
hension of being "looked-at,".and the conceptual exist-
ing of the body as a point of view has also been under-
cut. It is almost as if I have actually become my 
lover, for in this engagement of double reciprocal in-
carnation I am allowing my lover to show forth the pos-
sibilities which constitute the project of her coroing-
to-be-as-flesh while simultaneously I appropriate these 
possibilities as my own. In short, as Sartre explic-
itly remarks (Sartre, p. 390), I aim not to caress my 
lover, but rather to caress myself with the flesh of my 
lover. And to the extent that I. succeed, my conscious-
ness has come to play upon the surface of my perspec-
tive-upon-the-world while simultaneously caressing it-
self with the touched passivity which is my lover's 
perspective lived-as-flesh. But I do not actually be-
come my lover, nor does she cease to exist the upsurge 
of possibilities which define her being-in-the-world. 
As the poet Rilke has already observed, a literal "to-
getherness" between two people 
100 
is an impossibility, and where it seems, neverthe-
less, to exist, it is a narrowing . , . which robs 
either one party or both of his fullest freedom and 
development. But, once the realization is accepted 
that even between the closest human beings infinite 
distances continue to exist, a wonderful living 
side by side can grow up, [granted] they succeed 
in loving the distance between which makes it pos-
sible for each to see the other whole and against 
a wide sky! 4 
One can, on Rilke's account, and Sartre's as well, enter 
into authentic human relations only by bringing to life 
the very distance which makes possible the sharing of 
preconceptual life-space. And bringing this "psychic" 
distance to life does not involve a conceptual positing 
of the side-by-sideness which each grows into. Rather, 
it involves the effectuation of relational lived-reci-
procity, which requires a pre-cognitive (and thus pre-
conceptual) engagement in lived-immediacy. 
Thus far, of course, we have nothing more than a 
characterization of the structure of an engagement in 
lived-immediacy. And even this characterization is de-
ficient. Before we have completed this "phenomenology" 
of lived-immediacy, however, I hope to have made clear 
not only the essential nature of this pre-thematic mode 
of experiencing, but equally well the role engagements 
in lived-immediacy must play in the development of an 
existential philosophy of freedom. To proceed along 
these lines, we must introduce and appropriate some 
Heideggerian concepts which are crucial for understand-
ing the pre-cognitive, "engaging" nature of relation-
al lived-reciprocity. But we must be prepared to move 
beyond Heidegger, and thus to think his concepts apart 
from the conceptual limitations of the philosophical 
framework presented us in Being and Time. After all, 
Heidegger's concern lies in laying the ontological foun-
dations for posing the Seinsfrage, the question towards 
Being, whereas our concern is with disclosing the struc-
ture of the field of human freedom. 
I 
One of Heidegger's initial moves in Being and Time 
aims to undercut the widely held assumption which -sug^ -
gests that I have a "place" only in terms of a central 
subjective focal-point to which objectified entities 
are related. For Heideggar, we are first and foremost 
"Beings-m-the-world:" 
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When the huinan being [Dasein] directs himself to-
wards something and grasps it, he does not somehow 
first get out of an inner sphere in which he ban 
been proximally encapsulated, but his primary kind 
of Being is such that he is always 'outside' 
alongside entities which he encounters and which 
belong to a world already discovered. 
When, for instance, I walk into my apartment, I am "at 
home," not in virtue of my physical proximity to the 
objects in my living room, but rather in virtue of a 
kind of "orientihg" which carries me out alongside the 
reference totality constituting "at-homene'ss." To cite 
an example, I see the stereo, not as something sitting 
on the floor across the room, but as an object which is 
ready to hand, as something usable. Through a "dese-
verant" act, I am brought closest to the stereo, and am 
indeed proximally "there" rather than here. This dese-
verant act, as my primordial encounter with the stereo, 
reveals an expressive (but non-conceptual) space dis-
closing the "readiness-to-hand" of the stereo. It is 
only in virtue of this prethematic disclosure that I 
come to have a "place," and only then because I have 
interpreted my "concernful Being-towards" in terms of a 
desire to relax with some music. In other words, I take 
my place only insofar as I am implicitly here but prox-
imally there in the world, engaged by the possibilities 
I allow to show forth (Heidegger, part 1, chapter III). 
This notion of "expressive" space (which is also to 
be found in the early writings of Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty) is crucial to the account we are giving of the 
structure of the engagement in lived-immediacy. For de-
spite its pre-conceptual nature, expressive space ac-
counts for our fundamental orientation in situation. I 
may have no location in objective space and time, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, but I am never without place 
in the Lebenswelt, for this is the prethematic dimension 
"in relation to which I am constantly situating my-
self."" If our fundamental orientation was always in 
terms of conceptual space, we would find ourselves in 
no position whatsoever to describe those experiences in 
which we are spontaneously engaged by lived-immediacy, 
no way at all to account for the upsurge of that moment 
when life is held, "like an arrested gesture, in photo-
graphic abeyance"(Wolfe, p. 269). 
But this is just a beginning, for there are, ac-
cording to Heidegger, two ways to "exist" expressive 
space. The most "common" way is to live as "they" live. 
One is then giving himself over (as One generally does) 
to those possibilities "presented" him by the way das 
Man has "publicly interpreted" things. And insofar as 
you tag along without questioning the everyday context 
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which engages you, you cannot help but say that some-
thing will happen then, that something else must be at-
tended to beforehand, or that something we failed to do 
on a former occasion must be attended to now. We tend 
to allow ourselves only so much time, without "deter-
mining", the time by any "specific reckoning" (Heidegger, 
p. «»62). And the time we "allow" ourselves is always 
determined "in terms of those very matters with which 
one concerns oneself environmentally," the things one 
does "all day long:" 
And the more Dasein is awaitingly absorbed in the 
object of its concern and forgets itself in not 
awaiting itself, the more does even the time which 
it 'allows' itself remain covered up by this way 
of 'allowing'. When Dasein is 'living along' in 
an everyday concernful manner, it just never under-
stands itself as running along in a Continuously 
enduring sequence of pure 'nows'. (Heidegger, 
p. 462) 
And so we keep wondering where the time has gone, never 
having time enough! We are too busy losing ourselves in 
daily routines, and so we lose our time as well. But 
this "loss of time" must not be confused with the loss 
of "time-sensation" which accompanies the engagement in 
lived-immediacy. When one loses himself amid, or to 
use the Sartrean expression, "becomes drunk in by," an 
exquisite painting, he is "authentically" living his 
time. Far from having "forgotten" himself, he has come 
back to himself in keeping silent. In short, something 
happens to change the way the human being responds to 
his situation. Heidegger calls this "something" a "re-
sponding" to "the call of conscience." But before we 
wade through the dense jungle of Heideggerian metaphor 
to establish the meaning of this happening, we should 
first understand that there is not a sudden "flare-up" 
of conscience, and secondly, that conscience does not 
"summon us back" from our lostness in the everyday world 
of das Man. Rather, conscience is more like a "point-
energy-source" which emits a wave-length audible only 
to the human being who "no longer says ' I ' . " 7 Locked 
onto this wave-length, the human being is anticipatory 
(in calling to itself from the ground of the future) 
and resolute (in keeping silent). And>of course, by no 
longer saying, "I," the human being is existing with-
out the "benefit" of his psychological ego. Thus its 
structure as an I-ness lacks all content, being "de-
fined" in terms of pure function: its structure as a 
keeping silent (its being-open) determines it to allow 
possibilities to show forth in their availability; its 
structure as anticipatory Dasein (its waiting-towards ) 8
determines it to project itself into and beyond possi-
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bilities of its own choosing, possibilities which it has 
allowed to show forth in virtue of its resoluteness. 
The human being who continually, engages situations from 
the "privileged perspective" of the psychological ego, 
and thus lives by the dictates of das Han, cover':? up 
its authentic mode of existing by_ listening away to das 
Kan. Such an individual is neither anticipatory nor 
resolute. Rather, one endeavors to assume a "posture" 
or "stance" that confronts in an attempt to dominate. 
You buy a certain automobile because it will "set you 
Up" with the kind of woman who is always fondling its 
fancy trim in the advertisements; or you endeavor in 
some Other way to project that "proper" image which will 
guarantee the "best results." But you seldom,if evpr, 
seriously question this "role" you are addicted to. In-
stead j you just keep "listening away," living in the 
"refuge" of das Han; and in so doing, you refuse to have 
yourself. Why? And what prompts yoii to step back from 
this absorption in the worldly affairs of das Han? The 
answer to both of these questions lies in the fact that 
our being-in-the-world is without foundation. And inso-
far as we are essentially ungrounded, our "place" is 
always "in question," always calling out to us from the 
ground of the future. We are prey to a constant stream 
of possibilities, and prey as well to anxiety [Angst]. 
Anxiety brings Us face to face with our being-in-the-
world; thus it bikings us face to face with our thrown-
ness, our already-being-engaged by some context of pos-
sTbTlities. In an attempt to cover up our anxiety, we 
flee into the'taken-for-granted context of das Han, al-
lowing others, "the Nobody [in particular3"~TlTeTäregger, 
p. 312), to define our place and tell us who we ought to 
be. We then come to have an image of ourselves as 
grounded, and our life takes on "new" meaning. But we 
cannot hide from the disclosure of our Being-possible. 
When we least expect it, anxiety strikes, and we are 
brought face to face with that structure of our Being 
which Heidegger terms "Being-ahead-of-itself" (Heideg-
ger, p. 23S). And with anxiety comes the recognition of 
our "Being-free for the freedom of choosing . . . and 
taking hold of" our projective authenticity. Of course, 
we can also choose to resubmerge ourselves in the publi-
cly interpreted realm of das Man. Anxiety, then, brings 
us face to face with the very, issue of our Being: we 
can either choose to have ourselves, so that we project 
ourselves upon possibilities of our own choosing; or we 
can choose to flee oui^selves, and step into a role dic-
tated by the societal drama at our disposal. As I will 
argue in my conclusion, Angst projects the individual 
into the situation pf having to choose between appro-
priating his freedom or effecting a flight from his 
freedom. But for now, it is enough to recognize that 
anxiety prompts the "interruption" of our "listening 
away," and paves the way for our anticipatory resolute-
ness. Whether we choose to appropriate or disregard 
this call to authenticity cannot be an issue here; nor 
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can the nature of the motivations which lead us to 
choose one mode of existing over the other. We must 
only come to see that the engagement in lived-immediacy 
is dependent upon the authentic mode of existing. This 
will involve us in a brief characterization of "authen-
tic" temporality. 
II 
Heidegger's description of the temporality struc-
turing our authentic mode of existing is presented in. 
the following nutshell: 
In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought 
back from distraction with the objects of one's 
closest concern, but it gets held in the future 
and in having been. That Present which is held in 
authentic temporality and which thus is authentic 
itself, we call the moment of vision. (Heidegger, 
p. 387) 
To unpack this nutshell, we need to see that the moment 
of vision is, to quote Alphonso Lingis, "a pulse of 
temporal existence" which "comes into its own, appro-
priates itself, anticipates its whole future, retains 
its whole past, [and] is absolutely present." 9 The 
moment of vision is not, then, some simple "now-point" 
caught up in a temporal stream characteristic of the 
"everyday" concernful attitude. There is, rather, an 
active synthesis of one's past, present, and future 
which temporally grounds the human being's fundamental 
I-ness while authentically disclosing his "ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being-his-Self" (Heidegger, p. 35«»). 
And we see from another passage in Lingis that to live 
in the authentic Present is quite simply to engage 
lived-immediacy. For 
the time which passes is not only nudged on by the 
continuous flow of presence; it is also abandoned 
by a present that stands in itself and no longer 
flows, cut loose by the force by which the instant 
closes in upon itself—which closes in upon it-
self against the emptiness ahead, postponing its 
expiration. (Lingis, p. 36) 
The instant interrupts everyday time-flight. It sur-
prises. Suddenly you are entranced, resolute, "like 
some creature held captiye before the hypnotic rhythm 
of a reptile's head, the dull, envenomed fascination of 
its eye."l° Only, in this instant of surprise, the 
fascination amounts to a coming-into-one's-own, a 
coming-back-to-self which is characteristic of the re-
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sponse one makes to the "call" of conscience. There is, 
more specifically, a being-with-own, insofar as the en-
trancement is a keeping silent. But we know as well 
that resolute Dasein is anticipatory, insofar as it 
calls to itself from the ground-of the future. And this 
means that the human being who engages authentic tempor-
ality, and consequently, lived-immediacy, is simulta-
neously making space available for what is Other. Heid-
egger writes that the human being's "resoluteness to-
wards itself" 
is what first makes it possible to let the Others 
who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potential!ty-
for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality 
in the solicitude which leaps forth arid Liberates. 
When the human being is resolute, it can become 
the 'conscience' of Others. Only by authentieally 
Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people au-
thentically be with one another. (Heidegger, 
p. 3»m) 
Thus, before we can come to allow the Other who engages 
us to show forth in his availability—without pre-
determining this availability in advance—we must be-
come open to our own Being-possible. We must, as it 
were, make space available for that which is our own. 
Only in learning to respond to the Self which we are 
without having to say, "i," can we authentically be with 
another. And to authentically be with another amounts 
to nothing less than engaging the relational belonging 
which takes its form as a "being-with-other-as-with-
own." For authentic being with another presupposes that 
"wonderful living side by side" which must first surface 
as a coming-into-one Ts-own. In other words, I must, to 
reintroduce the Sartrean metaphor, become a "touched 
passivity," before I can allow the Other who engages me 
to show forth, and thus "shape," the possibilities 
which constitute its ownmost potentiality for being au-
thentic. But this being-with-other-as-with-own is not 
merely relational belonging characterized by lived-rec-
iprocity. Engaged reciprocity is freedom. This at 
least is the view of Albert Hofstadter.H If we come 
to accept his conception of freedom, we will have set 
ourselves up to conclude that the engagement in lived-
immediacy is the very field of human freedom, for we 
will have derived his notion of being-with-other-as-
with-own from the foundation of our analysis of ex-
pressive space, authentic temporality and the funda-
mental orientation which grounds our authentic being 
with Others.. In turning now to an analysis of his key 
suggestions, we must bear in mind that the Self we are 
dealing with is not an I-ness that takes its orien-
tation from das Han. We are speaking, rather, of our 
fundamental "I-ness," the Self which has been called 
back into the stillness of itself from the ground of 
the future. 
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III 
HofStädter suggests that man's "fitting relation-
ship" to otherness is the one in which, by appropriating 
the other to himself and himself to the other, he "fi-
nally reaches the appropriate, what is appropriate both 
to him and the other."1? It is in this "appropriateness 
of relationships" that human freedom is found to lie. 
Furthermore, such relational belonging between self and 
other is dependent upon an appropriation of self to 
other which not only reduces beyond the limitations of 
its own "predilections" but which also allows this other 
to "be what it is and tell what it is."l 3 This is, of 
course, the very relation of lived-reciprocity we have 
been referring to as a mental turning-towards which 
lets the entity which is available for concernful regard 
"be" in its presentation of itself. Thus when the Self 
comes to appropriate otherness, it must first have de-
sired to give itself over to the holding of this other 
which the Self truly identifies with. And when this 
other is another Self, then the appropriation is an act 
of "love," an embracement of the Other's right to be its 
own authentic Self. If this love is reciprocated, the 
relation takes the form of authentic being-with-on'e-
another. Hofstadter fleshes out the significance of 
this relationship in the following passage: 
When the other becomes kin and own, in a relation 
of reciprocal belonging, then it no longer limits, 
but complements, completes, and liberates. It is 
through kinship with what is other than myself that 
I am able, in my Being, to point toward that other 
and participate with it in our belonging to one 
another. My Being then assumes a meaning that 
transcends the limitations of my existence in space 
and time and the body, while yet I remain in space, 
time, and the body.14 
The point here is that reciprocal belonging, as the re-
lation in which each participant has given himself over 
to the project of making space available for his other, 
transpires only when the "self/other" dichotomy breaks 
down. One can transcend the limitations of one's ex-
istence in objective space and time only to the extent 
that one has overcome the temptation for taking a "per-
spective" which objectifies the relational participants. 
And this "transcending" is essential if one is to allow 
what is "other" to show forth as the Being-possible 
which engages his anticipatory resoluteness. For only 
then does the Other become truly "kin and own." But as 
we have seen, such kinship amounts to reciprocal be-
longing, which is only possible to the extent that Self 
and Other are engaged by the immediacy of lived-reci-
procity. Consequently, it seems clear that Hofstadter 
10 7 
is implicitly depending upon the structure of the en-
gagement in lived-iminediacy when he offers his key sug-
gestions concerning the nature of human freedom. More 
importantly, he seems to suggest as well that engage-
ments in lived-immediacy actually harbor freedom. This 
would mean, of course, that the engagement in lived-
immediacy is the very "field" of human freedom which 
makes possible the fitting relationship Hofstadter terms 
"reciprocal belonging." I use the expression "field" 
to draw explicit attention to the engaging nature of 
expressive space, as well as to the "structuring" qual-
ity which accompanies the upsurge of authentic tempor-
ality which Heidegger terms the "moment of vision." 
Expressive space engages because there is no "detach- ' 
ment." The moment ol vision structures the engagement 
by holding life "in photographic abeyance." Together, 
these two lived-qualities "shape" the orientation which 
harbors reciprocal belonging. Since this reciprocal be-
longing is a being-with-other-as-with-own, it would 
seem to follow that human freedom is only possible with-
in the upsurge of orientation which we term the engage-
ment in lived-immediacy, and that this engagement is 
thus the very "field" of human freedom. 
In the concluding remarks which follow, this sug-
gestion will be defended. At the same time, we must, en-
deavor to show that the "Self" we call "free" must be 
the Self which has given itself over to its ownmost-po-
tentiality-for-Deing-authentic. This will necessitate 
'Showing that one who chooses to live by the dictates 
of das Han cannot be free, since the very possibilities 
he projects hiniself~into, and the corresponding "self" 
which is the structure of these possibilities, are not 
his own, but another* s. % 
XV 
Determinists and Free-will advocates argue over the 
status of choices and their relation to actions per-
formed by an agent who has (and is assumed to exercise) 
the capacity to choose in accordance with intentions and 
motives. But they agree on one point: an action i s — 
by definition—preceded by a "preconceived project."15 
Their meaning is clear: if we are to speak of actions 
which are "free," we must limit ourselves to an analysis 
of the conceptual awareness and deliberative thinking 
which necessarily precedes and "guides" the performing 
of the action. Consequently, the Determinist argues 
that one's actions cannot be free, since the deliber-
ation and conscious awareness which precede the actual 
performance are determined by the limitations of one's 
life-situation—limitations which dictate the actual 
behavior from which the choices necessarily spring. And 
the Free-will advocate argues that one's choices are in-
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deed free, given the simple fact that one could easily 
have "chosen a different preconceived project if he had 
so desired. 
Life-world philosophers, on the other hand, must 
"undercut" this controversy, for they ground their 
thinking solely in the fact of a human existing which 
orients itself "primordially" by means of a pre-thematic 
encounter. And this means undercutting the central as-
sumption which members on both sides of the argument 
accept as fundamental. The Life-world philosophers suc-
ceed in this endeavor by assuming the possibility of 
actions which precede any conscious awareness which 
would lead to deliberation, desire, and intention. 
Actions occur, these thinkers suggest, which are not the 
product of a preconceived project. Such actions are 
one's projective Being in its unfolding. Furthermore, 
these are actions one can meaningfully call "free," 
since they alone are performed by a "Self" which is its 
own. But how can we then proceed to argue that only 
such actions are free? How, in other words, are we to 
argue that those who live by the dictates of das Man 
cannot act freely? 
We must begin by recollecting what "freedom" means 
to us, while remembering our previous interpretation of 
the way of existing peculiar to those who live in total 
disregard for their authenticity. Those who spurn their 
authenticity in favor of the sanctuary of the taken-for-
granted context of das Man are wholly determined by the 
motives and "nebulous presence" of a "They-self" which . 
is both everywhere and nowhere. Living in the midst of 
our everyday concernful attitude, we strive to "fit in, 
go along, agree, and thereby avoid the insecurity, fear, 
rejection, shame, and embarrassment that would derive 
from acting otherwise." 1 6 Is this freedom? Heidegger 
tells us at one point in Being and Time that "everyday" 
Dasein 
stands in subjection to Others. It itself is_ not; 
its Being has been taken away by the Others. Da-
sein* s everyday possibilities are for the Others 
to dispose of as they please. These Others, more-
over, are not definite Others. On the contrary, 
any Other can represent them. What is decisive is 
just that inconspicuous domination by Others which 
has already been taken over unawares from Dasein 
as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself 
and enhances their power. (Heidegger, p. 164) 
Thus, not only are we "determined" by our subjection to 
das Han, but we are not even ourselves! We are one of 
them! Locked into the nonspontaneous, routine-filled 
attitude of everyday concern, we are not free because 
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we will not have ourselves. We "choose" ourselves in 
bad faith by shirking responsibility for what we must 
become. But this choice is not our freedom. It is pre-
cisely a flight from freedom. We are giving ourselves 
over to the role of living the "pre-cast" life demanded 
of Us by the very structure of das Man 1s drama. And of 
course, we act as though we were free, carefully weigh-
ing the pros and cons of the possibilities given over 
to us for appropriation without questioning. But this 
is only because the domination by the motives and in-
tentions of das Man—which are our motives and inten-
tions, insofar as we promote the very role assigned to 
us in the drama—this self-assumed determining factor 
in our lives, is inconspicuous. To actually exercise 
freedom, one must break through this domination and step 
back into the stillness of one's ownmost Self. Martin 
Buber writes that man must "find his way from the ca-
sual, accessory elements of his existence to his own 
self." He must, in other words, 
find his own self; not the trivial ego of the ego-
istic individual, but the deeper self of the person 
living in a relationship to the world. And that is 
contrary to everything we are accustomed to.^ 7 
From our interpretation of Heidegger, we know that one 
"finds" his way to his ownmost self by keeping silent, 
by no longer saying, "I." One must give up his "de-
taching" perspective and thus cease to be any kind of 
"spectator" at all. One must open himself to a relation 
of reciprocal belonging which exhibits the relative flow 
of existence necessary for human reality to engage free-
dom. Only then is there a "reaching out across the 
bounds of one's own being" which allows for one's parti-
cipation "in the being of another. 
Yet this participation, which involves "letting 
ourselves go," is not a "cognitive" being-with-other. 
It must be pre-cognitive, insofar as the participant 
lacks the perspective necessary to take a point of view 
on the object engaging his fascination. Thus I do not 
in anyway absorb my other, nor do I become my other. 
Rather, I have appropriated the "fittTng" -relationship 
to my other, by letting the character inherent in this 
other present itself to me directly, so that it becomes 
the very content of my own life's expression. In a 
striking passage from Thomas Wolfe's Of Time and the 
River, we find the intensity of just such an encounter 
captured in words: 
He turned, and saw her then, and so finding her, 
was lost, and so losing self, was found, and so 
seeing her, saw for a fading moment only the pleas-
ant image of the woman that perhaps she was, and 
that life saw. He never knew: he only knew that 
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from that moment his spirit was impaled upon the 
knife of love. From that moment on he never was 
again to lose her utterly, never to wholly re-pos-
sess unto himself the lonely, wild integrity of 
youth which had been his. At that instant of their 
meeting, that proud inviolability of youth Was 
broken, not to be restored. At that moment of 
their meeting she got into his life by some dark 
magic, and before he knew it, he had her beating 
in the pulses of his blood.19 
Wolfe's character, by no longer saying "1," allows his 
0ther to show forth in her ownmost potentiality-for-
Being, while simultaneously, he appropriates the content 
of this possibilization of her being as the expression 
of his own lived-possibilities. Only in this manner 
can she come to beat in the pulses of his blood. If he 
does not reach out across the bounds of his own being, 
and thus allow himself to be "caressed" by his Other, 
then he can never come to participate in the being of 
his Other, and he will not be free. After all, he will 
not be open to the possibility of sharing life-space, 
then she cannot get into his life. 
Keeping-silent is opening oneself to the possibil-
ity of sharing life-space. Sharing life-space is au-
thentic being-with-another, and this is only possible 
if each participant appropriates the relational lived-
reciprocity which Albert Hofstadter has termed "being-
with-other-as-with-own." If one is then willing to ac-
cept Hofstadter's interpretation of this, relation as 
freedom, then it is a mere formality to suggest that 
human freedom is only brought to concrete expression in 
the sharing of life-space. And one is then in position 
to conclude that this very relative flow of existence 
which is brought to presence in the spatial/temporal 
immediacy constitutes the field of human freedom. 
V 
We have argued in this paper that human beings can 
choose either to appropriate their freedom (by engaging 
lived-immediacy) or to effect a flight from their free-
dom (by succumbing to the dictates of das Man). Freedom 
thus becomes an achievement, though by no means a prop-
erty which one "possesses," and more importantly, an 
achievement which is continually reborn to the extent 
that the individual is able to engage lived-reciprocity. 
It is, furthermore, an achievement which is never won, 
insofar as it is nothing more than "a moment's flash of 
grace and intuition." 2 0 If we try to take a point of 
view on it, if we try to capture it in context, "it 
melts away like smoke, is gone forever, and the snake is 
Ill 
eating at our heart again; we see then what we are and 
what our lives must come to."21 
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